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I. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the ethics of 
confidentiality in the professions. Each profession has its own 
policy regarding confidential communications outlined in its ethical 
code. Such rules are in place to guide the actions of the members 
of a given profession. Most professions currently adhere to a general 
rule of confidentiality but allow exceptions in certain circumstances. 
For example, the American Psychiatric Association's code of 
conduct includes a rule that allows a psychiatrist to breach her 
client's confidence whenever that client poses a significant threat 
of harm to himself or an innocent third party.1 One encounters 
similar exceptions to confidentiality in other professional codes of 
ethics. These exceptions seem to suggest that a client's 'right to 
privacy' sometimes conflicts with the basic rights of others, such 
as the rights to life and bodily integrity. However, I shall argue that 
this conflict does not seem to provide a sufficient reason to break a 
client's confidence. 
I will begin by outlining one dilemma faced by professionals 
in regards to confidentiality, namely, that of choosing between 
maintaining a client's confidence or violating it in order to protect 
a third party at risk of harm. Of particular interest to me is the 
professional confronted by an "uncooperative" HIV-infected client 
- someone who presents a significant threat of harm to a third party, 
yet refuses to warn that person of the danger. The harm mentioned 
in this particular case, of course, is the transmission of HIV from 
the infected client to an unsuspecting third party. I will lay out this 
dilemma in concrete form in the second section. 
Next, I will establish a justification for the importance of 
confidentiality in the professional setting. Although the duty of 
confidentiality is considered by most to be a crucial fixture in 
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relationships between professionals and their clients, there is 
disagreement about the scope or strength of this duty. The California 
Supreme Court case Tarasoff v. University of California (1976) 
established case law requiring psychiatrists to break confidence 
whenever doing so would protect third parties at risk of harm from 
their clients. I will lay out the details of this landmark case later in 
the paper and will argue that the case may have been wrongly 
decided. 
I shall also make a case for the assertion that HIV/AIDS raises 
several unique difficulties in terms of confidentiality and privacy. 
In addition, I will present some of the most common arguments for 
and against partner notification in cases of HIV/ AIDS. 2 Although 
in this paper I am not arguing for or against a formalized program 
of partner notification, it might be helpful to look at arguments on 
both sides of the issue in order to bring to light concerns that often 
arise in considerations of notifying at-risk partners. 
I will then take as my task to look at the issue of confidentiality 
from the perspectives of two very influential philosophical 
traditions: Kantianism and act utilitarianism. On my interpretation 
of Kantian moral theory, Kant would advocate an absolute rule of 
confidentiality - one that allows no exceptions whatsoever. The 
act utilitarian, on the other hand, would allow for exceptions to a 
general rule of confidentiality. Such exceptions would be generated 
by considerations of utility, meaning that whenever breaking a 
client's confidence would promote more good than maintaining it, 
then the client's confidence should be breached. In my view, the 
best position on confidentiality represents a compromise between 
these two approaches. 
I will advocate a rule utilitarian approach to considerations of 
confidentiality in the professions. I take rule utilitarianism to be a 
compromise between act utilitarianism and Kantianism because it 
borrows important features from each theory and combines them 
into an attractive synthesis. Rule utilitarianism takes from Kant's 
theory the notion of impartiali ty. Kant, by emphas iz ing 
universalization as the test for formulating moral rules, attempts to 
eliminate instances in which people make exceptions of themselves. 
Maxims of action that fail the universalization test are taken to be 
moral prohibitions, and these prohibitions are absolute moral rules 
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of the form 'never do such and such.' Similarly, rule utilitarian 
rules are absolute. But Kant does not give consequences as much 
consideration as he should. Rule utilitarianism remedies Kant's 
complete denial of consequentialism by basing its rules on their 
conformity to the principle of utility. 
Although rule utilitarianism does allow exceptions to be built 
into moral rules, my particular view is that there can be no 
exceptions to an effective rule of confidentiality in the professions, 
where an effective rule is one that facilitates the proper functioning 
of the profession. In what will essentially turn out to be an argument 
by e l iminat ion, I will examine several possible rules of 
confidentiality with exceptions built into them, as well as the 
possibility of having no rule of confidentiality at all. After analyzing 
each of these rules and non-rules, and determining each to be 
inadequate for its intended purpose, I will ultimately argue that the 
only good rule of confidentiality in the professions is one that is 
exceptionless. Thus, a professional should never violate his client's 
confidence, even if doing so would prevent great harm to a third 
party at risk, as in the case of an uncooperative HIV-infected client 
and the person(s) he may intentionally harm. 
II. The Professional's Dilemma 
In order better to explain the professional's dilemma with 
regards to confidentiality, I shall outline a concrete example of a 
professional faced with a choice between maintaining his client's 
confidence or violating it in the interest of protecting a third party 
at risk of harm. Consider the following scenario: 
A 32-year old man, married with two children, 
goes to his family practitioner to get an HIV test. 
His test results come back positive. As is customary 
when informing patients of test results in cases of 
HIV/ AIDS, the physician meets with the man to 
discuss the results and offer counseling. The 
physician informs his patient that he has tested 
positive for HIV and gives him information about 
the disease and its effects. He also advises the 
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patient that he should inform his wife of his 
infected status and encourage her to get tested as 
soon as possible. Furthermore, the man should 
practice safe sex with his wife, if he does not do 
so already. However, during the course of the 
counseling session, the patient tells the physician 
that he likely contracted the virus during an 
encounter with a prostitute. The patient does not 
want to start wearing a condom during sex because 
it might make his wife suspicious; nor does he want 
to tell her that he is HIV positive because it will 
reveal his infidelity. Despite any advice the 
physician offers against this course of action, the 
patient insists on keeping his infected status a 
secret from his wife. The physician truly believes 
that his patient will intentionally put his 
unsuspecting wife in danger by exposing her 
unknowingly to the deadly virus. Should he warn 
his patient's wife of the potential danger? 
On the one hand, the physician has a duty to respect the privacy 
rights of his patient. Therefore, he should not warn the man's wife 
of her husband's infected status. On the other hand, it seems 
inhumane to let an innocent third party come into harm's way when 
the harm could be prevented. Thus, the physician should warn the 
man's wife. This scenario provides just one example of the general 
dilemma facing any professional with a client who poses a risk of 
harm to an innocent third party. 
Of course , the client can always waive his right to 
confidentiality, in which case it would be relatively non-
controversial for the physician, psychiatrist, health department 
official, and so on to warn the at-risk party because the client has 
given them permission to do so. In fact, this often happens in cases 
of people who test positive for HIV. Most of them either inform 
past and present sexual or needle-sharing partners of their infected 
status on their own or enlist the aid of public health officials in 
doing so. But these are not the interesting cases. The tough issue 
involves actions that stand in direct opposition to the wishes of the 
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client, and the pertinent question is whether it is ever morally 
permissible for a professional to break her client's confidence. The 
case outlined above provides an example of the confidentiality 
dilemma in instances of partner notification in cases of HIV/AIDS. 
In section five, I will elaborate on the unique repercussions of 
breaches of confidentiality in HIV cases. 
III. //; Defense of Confidentiality 
The importance of confidentiality in the professions has been 
defended from several viewpoints. Beauchamp and Childress lay 
out the argument from consequentialism in their discussion of 
confidentiality in Principles of Biomedical Ethics.* From the 
consequentialist perspective, confidentiality facilitates the proper 
functioning of the beneficial role that a profession plays within 
society. Professions such as psychiatry, medicine and law exist 
because they serve a utilitarian social function. For example, 
psychiatric professionals often treat potentially dangerous patients 
who have psychiatric disorders, which may cause them to harm 
themselves or an innocent third party. It promotes overall well-
being when psychiatrists are able successfully to treat a mentally 
ill client, thus increasing the happiness ofthat particular client, as 
well as preventing possible maleficent actions the patient might 
have performed if untreated. 
Because a given profession promotes social utility - and I will 
continue to use psychiatry as my example for the sake of continuity 
- we want the professional to be successful in his mission. However, 
successful treatment depends on the completeness of the personal 
information the client communicates to the professional. For 
instance, if a psychiatric patient is not willing to disclose fully her 
feelings, then the psychiatrist likely will not be able to make an 
accurate d iagnosis of the c l ient ' s condi t ion . Therefore , 
confidentiality must play a role in the relationship between 
professionals and their clients. Beauchamp and Childress point out 
that "Assurance of confidence is of paramount importance because 
it allows people to seek help without the stigma that would result 
from public knowledge: It encourages full disclosure essential for 
effective treatment, and it is necessary for the maintenance of trust."4 
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A dient who is aware that what she communicates with her therapist 
will never be shared with a third party is more likely to disclose 
fully her feelings than the client who fears that her private 
information will be leaked to persons outside the professional-client 
re la t ionship . Thus , confidential i ty is just i f ied from a 
consequentialist perspective insofar as it promotes social utility. 
IV. The Tarasoff Precedent 
Although some form of confidentiality is generally considered 
to be important in maintaining the professional-client relationship, 
there is wide disagreement about the proper scope of confidentiality. 
That is, some people argue that the principle of confidentiality 
should govern all communications between a professional and his 
client, while others believe that certain information falls outside 
the purview of confidentiality. 
A majority of the judges in the landmark California Supreme 
Court Case Tarasoff v. University of California (1976) took the 
latter view of the professional duty of confidentiality. The case in 
question involved two University of California students - Prosenjit 
Poddar and Tatiana Tarasoff. Prosenjit and Tatiana dated for a short 
time, but Tatiana quickly lost interest when she began to notice 
Prosenjit's possessive behavior patterns. Tatiana took a summer 
trip to Brazil to avoid her possessive suitor. Soon after Tatiana's 
departure, Prosenjit became very depressed, and he began seeing a 
psychiatrist at the university hospital in 1969. 
During these sessions, Prosenjit confessed his intention to kill 
Tatiana when she returned to the country at the end of the summer. 
The psychiatrist treating Prosenjit, Dr. Lawrence Moore, notified 
campus police officers and requested that they detain Prosenjit for 
civil commitment. The police took Prosenjit into custody, but then 
released him after he promised not to harm Tatiana. The Director 
of Psychiatry at the hospital ordered that Prosenjit's file be destroyed 
and that no further attempt be made to have him committed. 
Prosenjit ended therapy and moved in with Tatiana's brother, very 
near Tatiana's apartment. When she returned to the country in 
October, Prosenjit went to her apartment to talk with her, and when 
Tatiana refused, Prosenjit stabbed her to death with a kitchen knife. 
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Tatiana's parents brought suit against both the psychotherapist 
who had treated Prosenjit and the University of California for failing 
to warn Tatiana or her parents of the threat Prosenjit posed to their 
daughter. The now familiar duty to warn arose out of the ensuing 
trial in 1974. Confusion surrounding this first trial prompted many 
professional agencies to urge the court to rehear the case, and it 
did, in 1976. Justice Tobriner, in the majority opinion in Tarasoff 
II, writes, "When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards 
of his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious 
danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use 
reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger."5 
This opinion established the obligation for professionals to warn 
third parties, or take whatever measures necessary to protect them 
from harm threatened by their clients. 6 
However, not everyone agrees that the judges in the Tarasoff 
case made the right decision. The case law established in the trial 
places the public well-being ahead of the privacy rights of individual 
clients. But one might argue that there is value in maintaining 
secrecy about information that might cause harm to the client if it 
were revealed to third parties. A client's HIV-positive status 
certainly falls into this category. 
V. Special Considerations in HIV/ AIDS Cases 
I chose the uncooperative HIV-infected individual as the 
example case for this paper because AIDS is an important 
contemporary issue, and because this particular case presents such 
a difficult dilemma in terms of confidentiality. There tends to be a 
division of concern between people in danger of contracting HIV 
and those people who already have the disease and are forced to 
deal with the controversy and social stigma that has surrounded 
HIV/AIDS from its very beginnings as an epidemic. Simply stated, 
the dilemma seems to present a choice between protecting the public 
health or protecting the privacy rights of particular individuals. 
In June of 1981, the first cases of a strange immune system 
failure in the gay male community began to surface.7 Approximately 
one year later, in July of 1982, public health officials in the United 
States named this new disease AIDS. 8 Because of its origins in the 
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gay community, AIDS was commonly called "gay cancer," among 
other things, and infected persons were ridiculed and often blamed 
for their own suffering. However, by 1982, the disease had begun 
to appear in hemophiliacs as well, signaling that it was not just 
transmittable through intimate homosexual contact, but also through 
the blood supply.9 Seventeen years later, despite knowledge that 
HIV can be transmitted through both heterosexual and homosexual 
sex, as well as through needle sharing among intravenous drug 
users, HIV/AIDS still often means enormous social stigmatization 
for those who are infected with the disease. Since the emergence 
of the disease, there have been massive efforts to educate the public 
about modes of HIV transmission and to combat discrimination 
against infected persons. Scientists are still searching for a cure for 
HIV/AIDS. 
Procedures for intervention in past sexually transmitted disease 
outbreaks have been the employment of mandatory names reporting 
of infectious persons, contact tracing of past sexual partners who 
may have been exposed, and even quarantine to protect the general 
population from the risk of infection. The concept of partner 
notification was introduced in 1937 by Surgeon General Thomas 
Parran for the control of syphilis.1 0 Tracing and treating every known 
contact of a syphilitic patient could interrupt the chain of 
transmission. Beginning in the late 1950's, contact tracing has been 
successfully used in a number of STDs such as syphilis, endemic 
gonorrhea, chlamydia, hepatitis B and several other infections." 
Gerald Stine writes that "The strategy in HIV partner notification 
is the same as that used for the other STDs: to identify HIV-infected 
individuals, counsel them, and offer whatever treatment is 
available." 1 2 This strategy emphasizes the prevention of HIV-
transmission by informing uninfected persons that they are at risk, 
and urging those persons who have already contracted HIV to alter 
their high-risk behaviors in order to prevent further disease 
transmission. While this strategy for partner notification seems 
simple enough, not everyone agrees that HIV/ AIDS is enough like 
other STDs that it should be treated in the same way. 
Some proponents of partner notification argue that HIV/ AIDS 
is similar to other STDs and should, therefore, be treated like other 
STDs. Tom Coburn cites the fact that traditionally enacted public 
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health procedures have curtailed the spread of other STDs and 
argues that "partner notification is the only timely way to alert those 
in danger of infection." 1 3 In opposition, though, Kenneth Mayer 
argues that HIV is not like other STDs. He says that "HIV's stigma 
forces many to live in fear of losing their jobs, homes, health 
insurance and families. It deters many from being tested, let alone 
treated." 1 4 He argues that a national database of HIV-infected 
individuals and national tracing of their sexual contacts will simply 
steer more "at-risk" people away from medical intervention. 1 5 
Furthermore, past contact tracing has been performed within 
carefully targeted and resource-intensive STD control programs, a 
strategy useful for diseases with short incubation periods and well-
known, low-cost cures or treatments that are easily attainable. Mayer 
says that HIV does not fit this description, and that contact tracing 
for HIV would be costly and ineffective.1 6 
As illustrated by Mayer's concerns, some people view HIV/ 
AIDS as a disease that gives rise to special considerations when 
drafting official policy. In the next section, I will lay out in more 
depth the arguments for and against a widespread program of partner 
notification in cases of HIV/AIDS. At least one of these arguments 
stems from considerations of the importance of confidentiality. 
VI. Partner Notification: For and Against 
There is a great deal of non-philosophical literature about the 
pros and cons of partner notification as a method of curtailing the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. The following list is typical of the arguments 
for and against partner notification found in articles in medical 
journals. 
In "Par tner Notification in the Control of Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection,"1 7 J. B. Muth and his colleagues 
cite three major objections to contact tracing for HIV/ AIDS. First, 
critics of contact tracing argue that it is inordinately expensive. 
Contacting every sex or needle-sharing partner of an HIV-positive 
individual requires a great deal of time, and paying employees to 
perform these searches is expensive. It is often very difficult to 
find a partner about whom the infected patient has little identifying 
information, or to trace people who have moved or changed names. 
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Furthermore, it is expensive to administer AIDS testing and provide 
counseling to new contacts. Muth and his colleagues argue in 
opposition to this objection by noting that while the estimated cost 
of partner notification programs is expensive, it is not "staggering," 
and it is worth the cost if lives are saved in even a few cases. 
Furthermore, a significant amount of money could be saved on 
treatment costs if HIV transmission were prevented. 
Second, critics of contact tracing argue that the procedure has 
negligible utility in the absence of effective medical intervention. 
This objection points to the fact that there is no existing cure for 
AIDS, only drugs with the potential to prolong an often very painful 
life. In light of the absence of a cure, many critics question the 
worth of notifying at-risk partners - prying into their personal lives 
and ripping them apart - when there is essentially nothing one can 
do to cure them if they test positive for HIV. Muth and his colleagues 
respond to this objection by arguing that although neither a vaccine 
nor a life-saving treatment is available for HIV/ AIDS, life-
prolonging compounds have been developed and others likely will 
be. Even if the only provision offered to newly notified parties is 
counseling designed to discourage high-risk behaviors that often 
lead to HIV transmission, its effects on society could be substantial. 
For example, a woman planning to conceive a child might alter her 
plans if she finds out she is HIV positive. Even if she is already 
pregnant, she might begin taking AZT, a drug that significantly 
reduces the risk of transmitting HIV between mother and child. 
Finally, opponents of contact tracing argue that contact tracing 
leaves the door open to excessive potential for personal 
stigmatization and discrimination. 1 8 Even if health department 
officials ensure absolute confidentiality when notifying at-risk 
partners, this assurance is often not enough to keep notified parties 
from deducing who it is that might have given them the virus. The 
person notified may have had intimate sexual contact with only 
one person in her lifetime, and thus, it would be safe for her to 
assume that her partner in that particular instance was the person 
who passed the disease on to her. Furthermore, the notified party 
might become angry enough to tell other people about the HIV-
positive status of her partner. Therefore, complete confidence could 
not be assured within a program of contact tracing. Muth et al. 
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respond by asserting their belief that adequate legislative protection 
for public health records and data is achievable. They cite the fact 
that health departments in the United States have a long and well-
established track record of protecting patient confidentiality.1 9 
Stine adds two more objections to partner notification to this 
list. First, he cites the argument that there is not much evidence 
that those who are informed of their infection will change the high-
risk behaviors that led to their infection in the first place. Stine also 
cites the fact that homosexuality is a crime in twenty-four states, 
and HIV-infected homosexuals fear prosecution for themselves and 
their sexual partner(s) if they acknowledge same-sex contacts. 2 0 
In addition to these arguments against contact tracing, Franklyn 
Judson writes that people who oppose partner notification often 
cite the number of contacts missed as a good justification for 
abandoning the effort.21 But although partner notification may seem 
ineffective if the individual case is the only unit of analysis, Muth 
et al. argue that "viewed in the aggregate ...the case finding 
outcomes are likely to be more productive than they appear 
individually."2 2 They also claim that there will be a lot of overlap 
among names mentioned because groups with the highest risk 
behaviors are small relative to the overall population. In addition, 
"over time, the proportion of located contacts who are newly 
identified as positive should diminish, testifying to diminished HIV 
transmission." 2 3 
Further advantages to partner notification are that it targets 
persons who are most likely to have been exposed to the infection. 
It also counterbalances the tendency of persons with high-risk 
profiles to be least inclined to seek counseling and testing services: 
"By personalizing the epidemic, partner notification not only 
discourages denial but also helps identify persons who otherwise 
may not perceive themselves to be at risk, especially exposed 
women in their child-bearing years." 2 4 Finally, proponents of partner 
notification argue that although partner notification is labor 
intensive, it is operationally simple. Almost all aspects of case-
interviewing, case-finding, testing and condom dispensing can be 
done in the field. 
Stephen Josephs questions opposition to partner notification: 
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How can one justify, on clinical, public health or 
humanitarian grounds, not notifying that surviving 
partner, who might be the source of the infection 
in the deceased, or the recipient of infection? 
Arguments against this procedure border on the 
absurd; one has to start with the premise that 
increased medical knowledge is more dangerous 
than helpful to the individual, and that the rights 
of the uninfected count for nothing against the 
rights of the infected.2 5 
Josephs argues that vigorous contact tracing, under conditions of 
strict confidentiality, is the most important step in reducing further 
progression of the HIV virus, and protecting those who, though 
unsuspecting, are at greatest risk of infection or in greatest need of 
early medical intervention.2 6 
In light of all the advantages cited by proponents, it may seem 
strange that opposition to partner notification in HIV/ AIDS cases 
still exists. One of the biggest obstacles to achieving widespread 
agreement with regard to partner notification is a concern with 
confidentiality and privacy. Gunderson, Mayo and Rhame write, 
"It is not an exaggeration to say that a person who is HIV infected 
may risk social death long before he or she faces physical death. 
HIV-infected persons have powerful prudential reasons for not 
wanting knowledge of their infected status to fall into the wrong 
hands." 2 7 Gay leaders in the late eighties expressed similar fears 
about discrimination that might result from enacting a partner 
notification program. A proposal in San Francisco that the health 
department provide contact tracing services to bisexual men whose 
female partners were at high risk of being exposed to the disease 
"was denounced as Orwellian because of the prospect of creating 
lists of bisexual men and their partners." 2 8 A similar proposal by 
the Minnesota Health Department in 1986 prompted one opponent 
of contact tracing to cite the fact that "'the road to the gas chamber 
began with lists in Weimar Germany.'" 2 9 Muth's general citation 
of the reputation of public health agencies in maintaining 
confidentiality seems like an unconvincing response to these very 
serious concerns. 
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Although I do not want to deal in this paper with the ethics of 
a formalized partner notification program, understanding the 
concerns that trouble opponents of such programs illuminates some 
unique problems one should consider when deciding whether it is 
ever morally permissible to warn, against a client's wishes, persons 
at risk of contracting HIV from that client. The consequences of 
widespread knowledge of a person's HIV-positive status can lead 
to horrific social, financial and personal conflicts for the infected 
individual. Recognizing this fact makes it more difficult to make 
hasty decisions in favor of warning at-risk parties in order to prevent 
the spread of HIV. 
VII. Kantian Ethics 
Before I attempt to give the Kantian response to the question 
of whether breaches of confidence are ever morally permissible, it 
might be helpful to introduce the main ideas of Kant's moral theory. 
Immanuel Kant envisioned morality as a system of categorical 
imperatives, where categorical imperatives are commands of pure 
practical reason, which command categorically, meaning that they 
cannot be overridden by human desires. It is crucial to Kant's theory 
to distinguish categorical from hypothetical imperatives. The 
distinction in question is one between moral and non-moral 
'oughts.' That is, hypothetical imperatives come into being as a 
result of some actual or possible desire and introduce a relationship 
of practical necessity. For example, 'if Ryan wants to go to graduate 
school, then Ryan ought to take the GRE.' This imperative gives 
the required action for fulfilling a possible desire. However, the 
'ought' in this command is not a moral ought, but simply an 
instrumental ought. Thus, if Ryan does not wish to go to graduate 
school, then Ryan need not take the GRE. The obligation expressed 
in a hypothetical imperative simply dissolves when the desire is 
removed. 
In sharp contrast, categorical imperatives are not desire-
dependent. The obligations embodied in categorical imperatives 
are moral obligations that prescribe duties. Kant holds that actions 
performed from duty are morally right, not because of the 
consequences generated by their performance, but instead, because 
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of the very fact that they are performed from duty. He writes that 
categorical imperatives are "not concerned with the matter of the 
action and its intended result, but rather with the form of the action 
and the principle from which it follows; what is essentially good in 
the action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences 
be what they may." 3 0 We will soon see that, with respect to 
consequences, Kant means what he says. 
Kant claims that all of our moral obligations can be derived 
from a single moral principle, which he calls the Categorical 
Imperative. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, he 
states the Categorical Imperative in the following terms: "Act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law." 3 1 Among other duties, Kant 
argues that perfect duties to others can be derived from this principle, 
and he offers the rule against false promising as an example of 
how to derive such a duty. Kant imagines a situation in which a 
man in need of money borrows it from a friend, even though he 
knows he cannot repay it. He knows he must promise to repay the 
money within a certain period of time in order to get the loan, but 
he also knows that such a promise would be a false one since he 
could not possibly pay the money back. The man asks himself 
whether this action would be contrary to duty. 
In order to make this determination, he must first determine 
the maxim of his action, which can be expressed in the following 
terms: "When I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow 
money and promise to pay it back, although I know that I can never 
do so." 3 2 Next, the man must universalize this maxim to see how 
things would stand if it were a universal law of nature. Fred 
Feldman, in "Kantian Ethics," explains Kant's procedure for 
universalization by distinguishing between the "generalized form" 
of a maxim and what I will call the maxim's individual form. 3 3 The 
maxim of false promising, stated above, fits Feldman's form of an 
individual maxim: "Whenever I am , I shall . " 3 4 In order to 
universalize this maxim, we must expand it to its generalized form: 
"Whenever anyone is , she will ." 
Kant's universalized form of the maxim for false promising 
fits well in Feldman's model: "anyone believing himself to be in 
difficulty could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of 
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not keeping it." 3 5 Although this proposition might be compatible 
with one's own future welfare, says Kant, it does not stand up under 
universalization because it would be "self-contradictory."3 6 There 
has been some confusion about what Kant means when he says 
that a maxim is self-contradictory. One popular interpretation 
suggests that, for Kant, a maxim is contradic tory when 
universalizing it would destroy the institution invoked by the 
maxim. For instance, in his example of promise keeping, a maxim 
that allows false promising would be self-contradictory because it 
would somehow destroy the institution of promising itself. Were it 
really the case that willing a maxim of false promising to be a 
universal law would destroy the institution of promising altogether, 
then this version of 'contradiction' might be plausible because in a 
world in which no promises existed, it would be logically impossible 
to will a false promise as the means of extricating oneself from 
difficulty. However, willing a maxim of false promising to be a 
universal law does not create a world void of promises. If everyone 
made false promises, then eventually, no one would believe anyone 
else's promises. However, an atmosphere of distrust does not entail 
the complete obliteration of promises. Promises can still be spoken 
of, even in a world in which no promise is ever believed. That is, 
promises can still exist - promises can even be issued - in a world 
that includes a universal law of false promising. While there are a 
few places in the Groundwork where one might construe Kant to 
be endorsing the view that universalizing a maxim of false 
promising destroys the institution of promising itself, I think it is 
more accurate, in view of the entire work, to attribute to Kant a 
different interpretation of 'self-contradictory.' 3 7 
A more comprehensive interpretation of Kant's moral theory 
yields the conclusion that propositions are contradictory insofar as 
they violate the following principle, which Kant takes to be an 
analytic truth: "Whoever wills the end, wills . . . also the means 
that are indispensably necessary to his actions and that lie in his 
power." 3 8 Thus, Kant holds that a rational person who wills an end 
wills also the means necessary to achieve that end. Suppose that a 
rational person adopts the following maxim: "In order to get money 
I will make a false promise." If false promising were the universal 
means of achieving the end of acquiring money, though, then no 
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one would believe promises made in situations where the promiser 
needed cash. Therefore, willing a maxim of false promising to be a 
universal law would remove the means by which the promiser could 
get the money she needs. Hence, by willing the maxim to be a 
universal law, the promiser simultaneously wills both the end of 
acquiring money and the elimination of the means of acquiring 
this money. That is, she simultaneously wills both to get the money 
and not to get the money. And this is just to say that she wills both 
p_ and not-p simultaneously. Thus, by willing that the maxim become 
a universal law, she wills a logical contradiction. Christine 
Korsgaard, in "Kant's Formula of Universal Law," 3 9 endorses this 
interpretation of 'contradiction' in Kant's writings. Regarding a 
maxim of false promising, Korsgaard writes: 
In the world of the universalized maxim, the 
hypothetical imperative from which the false 
promiser constructs his maxim is no longer true. 
It was 'if you want some ready cash, you ought to 
make a false promise.' But at the same time that 
he employs this hypothetical imperative in 
constructing his maxim, he wills its falsification, 
by willing a state of affairs (the world of the 
universalized maxim) in which it will be false. 4 0 
Thus, when Kant claims that the maxim for false promising 
could not hold as a universal law of nature, he means that if all 
people took as their maxim, "whenever I am in difficulty I will 
extricate myself from that difficulty by means of a false promise," 
then any time someone in a difficulty made a promise, no one would 
believe the promise because everyone would be aware of the maxim 
that allowed false promises. But if no one believed promises made 
in these situations, then no one would ever provide the means needed 
to extricate the promiser from difficulty. Thus, by willing the maxim 
of false promising to be a universal law, one simultaneously wills 
to eliminate the means of achieving the intended end of the action. 
In the case of borrowing money, willing the maxim of false 
promising to be a universal law would result in public knowledge 
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of the falsity of the borrower's promise to repay the loan; and 
therefore, no one would lend the man money. By universalizing 
his maxim, he wills the defeat of the end of his action: acquiring 
cash. 
VIII. Kantian Approach to Confidentiality 
In the previous section, I outlined Kant's derivation from the 
Categorical Imperative of a perfect duty against false promising. If 
breaking a client's confidence is equivalent to breaking a promise 
made to that client, then Kant would have to be opposed to 
performing such an action. Thus, it might be helpful for our purposes 
to conceptualize a breach of confidence as a broken promise. If 
breaking promises is always prohibited, and breaching client 
confidence is an instance of breaking a promise (and I will argue 
that it is), then we can conclude that Kant would advocate an 
absolute rule of confidentiality. 
Consider the following promise: "I promise to keep all client 
information in the strictest confidence, unless by breaking my 
client's confidence, I can prevent harm to a third party." In this 
case, the scope of the promise of confidentiality is limited by an 
exception, or a condition. This promise makes confidentiality 
conditional on the type of information shared by the client. If the 
client communicates intent to harm an innocent third party, then 
the promise is void because this type of information is not covered 
by the promise. In this example, then, warning third parties at risk 
of harm from your client is not a breach of confidence, nor a broken 
promise. 
However, a professional rule that entails such a promise is a 
foolish rule. If a client knows that information about intent to harm 
third parties is not covered by the promise of confidentiality, then 
the client will not divulge information of this nature. Thus, the 
professional will be in no position to protect a third party at risk of 
harm because he will not be aware that any danger exists. Hence, a 
promise of confidentiality with built-in exceptions defeats the 
purpose of having the exceptions to begin with, which in this 
particular case is to prevent harm to third parties at risk. 
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Therefore, the only promise of confidentiality Kant could allow 
is one that is absolute, such as, "I promise to keep absolutely all 
client information in the strictest confidence." But if this is the 
promise made to clients, then all breaches of confidence are cases 
of breaking promises. And since Kant believes that false promising 
is morally prohibited, then breaking confidence under his view is 
never morally permissible. Thus, in regards to the professional's 
dilemma in the case of the uncooperative HIV/AIDS client, Kant 
would argue that the professional is obligated to remain silent, even 
though his motivation for speaking out is a concern for preventing 
the death of an innocent third party. 
There is one point, in Lectures on Ethics, where Kant diverges 
from his otherwise absolutist stance against lying or breaking 
promises. He writes, "The forcing of a statement from me under 
conditions which convince me that improper use would be made 
of it is the only case in which I can be justified in telling a white 
lie." 4 1 Kant argues, in this segment, that a lie can justifiably be 
used as a "weapon of defense." 4 2 However, he goes on to write that 
"a lie is a lie, and is in itself intrinsically base whether it be told 
with good or bad intent... There are no lies which may not be the 
source of evil." 4 3 Furthermore, the rest of Kant's ethical writings 
indicate his belief in a moral prohibition against lying or breaking 
promises. Regardless of where Kant came down in the end, an 
argument against ever telling a lie or breaking a promise can be 
made using Kant's Categorical Imperative. 
But many intelligent people think such an argument is too 
stringent. For example, the judges in the Tarasoff case ruled that 
the prevention of harm to a third party at risk is, in fact, a very 
compelling reason to break a client's confidence. Be that as it may, 
though, Kant has shown himself to be serious about the 
exceptionless nature of our moral obligations. For instance, in his 
essay, "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives," Kant 
advocates the view that one is morally obliged to be truthful with a 
murderer who comes to one's door looking for a friend one is hiding 
in the closet. Even in this case, when lying might save another's 
life, one is obligated to be honest with the murderer. Kant writes, 
"it [truthfulness] ... is an unconditional duty which holds in all 
c i rcumstances ." 4 4 Although lying to a murderer about the 
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whereabouts of a friend may seem, intuitively, like the right thing 
to do, Kant might have us imagine a world in which something 
like the following maxim of action were a universal law: in order 
to prevent great harm to others, I will lie to protect them. Kant 
seems to think that lying to the murderer at the door would generate 
a logical contradiction. That is, if we imagine the above maxim as 
both universal and public, then everyone would know that whenever 
we were trying to prevent harm to a third party, we would lie to 
protect them. Thus, no one would believe us when we claimed to 
be ignorant of the potential victim's whereabouts. 
Therefore, by willing the maxim as a universal law, we 
simultaneously will the elimination of the means of achieving our 
end of protecting the third party from harm. In order for lies to 
work, one must be deceived by them. But if the murderer does not 
believe the lie because of the maxim that allows lying to protect 
people from harm, then the lie will not deceive him. Thus, the 
murderer might storm into your home and find his victim anyway, 
despite any information you provide him with. The lie in this case 
will be no more efficacious than the false promise in Kant's example 
of the man in need of money who borrows it and promises to repay 
it, even though he knows he will never be able to do so. 
James Rachels objects to Kant's view that it is always immoral 
to lie, even when doing so will save the life of a third party. He 
argues for what is a common position against Kant. That is, he 
claims that the maxim of our action could be rephrased so that it 
could be universalized without contradiction. Rachels agrees that 
Kant's formulation of the maxim, "in order to prevent great harm 
to o thers , I will lie to protect them," does not pass the 
universalization test. However, he argues that this maxim for lying 
could be rewritten to meet the criterion for universalization in the 
following way: '"It is permissible to lie when doing so would save 
someone's life. '" 4 5 Rachels claims that one could will that this 
maxim become a universal law without its being self-defeating. 
Problematically, though, he does not provide any proof for this 
assertion. In fact, if one works out the derivation, one realizes that 
the maxim does not pass the universalization test. Rather, it is self-
defeating. For the end of the proposed action is to save another's 
life. However, if everyone knew that people lied when they were 
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in the position to save someone's life, then no one would believe 
such lies. Thus, no one's life could be saved on this approach, and 
therefore, it does not follow from Rachels' lying maxim that Kant's 
overall argument against lying is invalid. Rachels' analysis has no 
affect on the truth of Kant's claim that all lying is morally prohibited 
because, in order to prove his claim, Kant needs only one derivation 
from the Categorical Imperative that demonstrates the impossibility 
of willing as a universal law a maxim of lying to prevent harm. As 
illustrated earlier, Kant provides this proof. 
Rachels anticipates this response to his objection and attempts 
to counter it by claiming that Kant's vision of the murderer's 
behavior is unrealistic. Kant argues that lying would not protect 
anyone from harm because murderers would not believe us if lying 
were a universal law. But Rachels says, "they would believe us if 
they thought we did not know what they were up to; and if they 
thought we did know what they were up to, they would not bother 
to ask us in the first place. This is no different from the situation 
that exists now, in the real world: murderers know that people will 
not willingly help them." 4 6 Korsgaard puts forth a similar argument 
in her essay, "The Right to Lie." 4 7 She challenges the idea that a 
murderer would come to your door asking about the location of a 
friend of yours whom he would like to kill. She says that "A 
murderer who expects to conduct his business by asking questions 
must suppose that you do not know who he is and what he has in 
mind." 4 8 She claims that a universal practice of lying could be 
permissible under these circumstances since your lie would be 
efficacious because the murderer would assume that you did not 
know you were addressing a murderer. That is, the murderer does 
not assume that you will lie because he does not believe you are 
aware of your circumstances. 
However, Korsgaard's (and thus Rachels') criticism of Kant 
seems to be flawed for the following reason: she assumes that the 
person who answers the door is a utilitarian. She says the murderer 
must assume that the person who answers the door does not know 
who he is and what he has in mind. But why does Korsgaard think 
the murderer must assume this? Because she believes that if the 
person who answers the door knows the person standing there is a 
murderer - and thus realizes the deadly consequences of telling 
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the truth about the location of her friend - then the person who 
answers the door will not help the murderer. But again, this line of 
reasoning assumes that the person answering the door is a 
consequentialist. So how is this view available to Kant, who is a 
non-consequential ist? Why not assume that Kant answers the door? 
If this were the case, then it would not matter what the murderer 
assumed about Kant's knowledge of his purposes. Even if Kant 
realized that he was being confronted by a murderer, he would still 
reveal the whereabouts of the potential victim because he holds 
that lying is impermissible in all circumstances. 
But let us assume that Rachels' and Korsgaard's observations 
concerning human behavior are correct. Their comments still are 
not problematic for Kantianism. Suppose one knew that she was 
dealing with a murderer at the door, but the murderer did not believe 
that she knew. In this case, lying might be effective in warding off 
the murderer. But why should we imagine this particular epistemic 
situation? Both Rachels and Korsgaard admit that murderers assume 
we do not know what they are up to when they ask us questions 
about intended victims. In fact, it is quite likely that we would not 
know we were being confronted by a murderer in such a situation. 
But if we were unaware that we were being confronted by a 
murderer, then the maxim of our action could not be "lie to prevent 
harm to a third party" because we would not know we were in a 
position to prevent such harm. Thus, we would not know it was a 
situation in which we should lie to protect our friend, and without 
being aware that we were in a situation described by the lying 
maxim, we might reveal the location of our friend and thereby 
jeopardize her life. 
Besides, we can imagine other cases in which Kant's argument 
against lying in order to prevent great harm to others clearly remains 
sound. For instance, suppose it is 1940 and you are living in Nazi 
Germany. SS officers are quite well known and very easy to identify. 
It is also known that these soldiers are searching for Jews, and 
when they find them, they take them to camps where they are 
tortured and, most often, murdered. Suppose you are hiding Jews 
in your attic. If an SS officer came to your door and asked if you 
were hiding Jews, you would know that the soldier intended great 
harm to the Jews. Yet, could you, in order to prevent harm, lie to 
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the solcher about your knowledge of the Jews' whereabouts? Kant 
would argue that you could not lie, even in this extreme situation, 
because the maxim of lying fails the universalization test. If this 
maxim were both universal and public, then the soldier would not 
believe your lie, but would instead search every single house for 
hidden Jews. But if he searched every house, then no one would be 
protected from harm. Therefore, the universalization of the maxim 
generates a contradiction inasmuch as it eliminates the means to 
achieving the intended end of the action. Rachels' and Korsgaard's 
respective claims that murderers assume we do not know what they 
are up to does not apply in this case because SS officers are 
identifiable by their uniforms as known murderers. Thus, they would 
not assume that you did not know what they were up to when they 
came to your door. 
Therefore, it seems evident that Kant is serious when he talks 
about the absolute nature of certain of our moral duties, as shown 
in his prohibitions against lying and breaking promises. It follows 
that he would be equally serious about a duty against breaking 
confidentiality. However, I think it is important to understand the 
duty of confidentiality in the professions as more than just a duty 
prescribed by moral law, but as a duty that corresponds to moral 
law while simultaneously promoting optimific consequences within 
the framework of society. That is, the duty of confidentiality, like 
all duties that can be generated from Kant's Categorical Imperative, 
should eliminate partiality. No one person should be able to make 
an exception of himself. In addition, though, moral duties should, 
at least in some way, promote the interests or well-being of the 
members of the society they govern. The promotion of well-being 
through the consequences of an action, though, is a utilitarian, not 
a Kantian concern. 
IX. Act v. Rule Utilitarian Ethics 
In sharp contrast to Kant's deontological absolutism is the 
consequentialist moral philosophy known as utilitarianism. 
Consequentialism determines the Tightness or wrongness of an 
action based solely on the consequences generated by its 
performance. Under the view of John Stuart Mill, perhaps the most 
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well known utilitarian, those actions whose consequences produce 
the greatest amount of happiness overall are taken to be morally 
right actions. This feature of Mill's theory is expressed in his 
"greatest happiness principle," which maintains that "actions are 
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as 
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is 
intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain 
and the privation of pleasure." 4 9 This principle is supposed to serve 
as a guide for making decisions about actions. While it is unclear 
whether Mill is an act or a rule utilitarian (or both), I will begin 
with a discussion of act utilitarianism. 
Some have found act utilitarianism to be a more acceptable 
moral doctrine than Kantian ethics because they believe that, in 
many cases, it conforms more readily to standard morality. These 
people think it is a mistake to overlook the consequences of an 
action when making determinations about the action's moral worth. 
Furthermore, many find Kant's rigid rejection of exceptions to moral 
rules contrary to what they consider the moral course of action. 
Act utilitarianism, though, by taking into account everyone's 
interests equally and allowing for a case by case evaluation of the 
moral worth of actions, seems to avoid some of these criticisms. 
Act utilitarianism evaluates individual actions based on their 
conformity to the principle of utility. Later, I will discuss another 
version of utilitarianism that utilizes the principle of utility to 
develop moral rules, which then become the moral standard by 
which individual acts are measured. 
Under act utilitarianism, no one person's well-being is more 
important than that of another person. Society is viewed as a whole, 
and the aggregate well-being is what counts. Thus, the act utilitarian 
professional considering whether to breach her client's confidence 
would have to give equal consideration both to the well-being of 
her client and to that of the third party at risk of harm. But these 
cons idera t ions do not rule out breaking the promise of 
confidentiality. In fact, if breaking the promise would promote more 
well-being overall, then the professional is obligated to do so. 
According to the act utilitarian, in the case of the man with a 
confirmed HIV diagnosis who refuses to inform his wife of his 
infected status, the professional must weigh the happiness of his 
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client against the happiness of the other affected parties. The patient 
himself has already communicated that he does not wish for his 
wife to know about his infected status because it will reveal his 
infidelity and probably end his marriage. Thus, the client's happiness 
would be reduced if the physician broke his confidence. Not only 
would he be angry with the physician for breaching the doctor-
client privilege, but also he would be devastated if his wife left 
him, taking their children with her. On the other hand, he might be 
equally devastated if his wife contracted the HIV virus as a result 
of his careless behavior. For that matter, his wife would be 
obviously worse off as well. She likely would feel resentment 
toward her husband and the physician because neither warned her 
of the impending danger. Furthermore, due to the chronic nature of 
AIDS, the couple's children would experience a great deal of 
unhappiness as a result of the premature deaths of their parents in 
the future. It seems clear that the most happiness would be produced 
in this particular situation if the physician warned the man's wife 
of the risk of harm she was incurring. 
This kind of deliberation at first seems relatively clear cut. 
However, a problem arises with utilizing act utilitarian theory to 
make deliberations about confidentiality in the professional setting. 
If the decision to maintain or break confidentiality is relative to 
each particular case, then the professional setting has the potential 
to become a breeding ground for individual professionals to make 
unfair and inconsistent judgments about which actions promote 
the greatest good for the greatest number of people. If we leave 
these important decisions up to the discretion of individual 
professionals, there may be abuses resulting in unfair breaches of 
confidence. For example, a psychiatrist who fears that his own child 
will be killed by one of his patient's may feel he is justified in 
breaking his client's confidence by reporting the perceived threat 
to the authorities. After all, he does not wish to be responsible for 
the preventable death of his own child. However, the same 
psychiatrist might be less apt to break his client's confidence to 
warn a third party the psychiatrist does not know personally but 
who is in the same amount of danger as his daughter is in the first 
example. If the goal is to promote the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people, and warning his daughter accomplishes this goal, 
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then warning a stranger presumably accomplishes the same goal. 
However, the personal nature of the threat to his daughter and the 
impersonal nature of the threat to a third party might prompt the 
individual psychiatrist to draw different conclusions about the 
permissibility of breaking his client's confidence in each situation. 
Therefore, the act utilitarian approach to confidentiality in the 
professions is inadequate because it leaves too much room for 
arbitrary decisions. 
This last consideration has led our discussion into a new realm 
of utilitarianism. Traditionally, utilitarianism has involved 
evaluating actions on a case-by-case basis and determining which 
actions promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people 
in terms of the consequences of particular actions. This form of 
utilitarianism has been called act, or direct utilitarianism, and it 
can be contrasted with rule, or indirect utilitarianism. Both forms 
take as their ultimate end the maximization of human happiness, 
but each achieves that end in a different way. I have already 
described the methods of the act utilitarian. The rule utilitarian, in 
contrast, does not evaluate individual acts in terms of the overall 
utility of their consequences. Instead, she develops a set of rules, 
compliance with which maximizes utility, where the rules in 
question would have to be something other than 'act so as to promote 
the greatest good for the greatest number of people.' The choices 
to perform individual acts are then determined on the basis of 
whether they adhere to these moral rules. 
If the professional setting is governed by ethical codes, then 
we must discuss utilitarian considerations in this setting in terms 
of rules. In a professional setting, the actions of the members should 
be guided by a general code of conduct agreed upon within the 
association in order to avoid the problems of inconsistency and 
unfairness outlined in the above discussion of act utilitarianism. 
Professionals faced with a tough ethical choice should consult the 
professional rules of conduct to aid them in making their decision. 
Thus, there must be some kind of uniformity across the board in 
terms of ethical policy, and these guidelines must be publicly 
available for purposes of informed consent. That is, a client who 
seeks the services of a professional must be informed of any policies 
that might affect the professional-client relationship. This kind of 
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talk falls under the rubric of informed consent, which ensures that 
before one compromises oneself in any way, one is fully aware of 
all one's options and the resulting consequences of each of those 
options. 
Although the professional setting seems to be governed best 
by rules, this is not to say that the rules will not have exceptions. In 
fact, it is common practice to build exceptions into the rules 
themselves. For example, we might imagine that the physician 
described above reaches the conclusion that he should inform the 
wife of the uncooperative AIDS patient through a process of 
reasoning that begins with a policy requiring physicians to maintain 
patient confidentiality, except in situations where the patient poses 
a significant threat of harm to an identifiable third party. As long as 
the exception is built into the rule ahead of time, then our application 
of the rule utilitarian approach in the case of confidentiality does 
not make it susceptible to the objection raised by David Lyons -
that rule and act utilitarianism are extensionally equivalent. This is 
a common objection raised against rule utilitarianism, and I will 
argue against this objection in section twelve when I lay out my 
own rule utilitarian argument in favor of an absolute rule of 
confidentiality. 
We should return to the rule formulation stated above, though, 
which allows a professional to breach confidence in cases where a 
third party stands to be harmed by his client. If this rule were the 
policy of a professional organization, then the policy would need 
to be made clear to the public. Presumably, though, if the HIV-
positive man described above knew about the policy that allowed 
physicians to break confidence in cases where a patient presents a 
significant threat of harm to a third party, then the man would not 
disclose his intention to keep his HIV-positive status a secret from 
his wife while continuing to practice unprotected sex with her. 
Instead, he would ensure the physician that he would inform his 
wife of the danger, and then he would leave the doctor's office and 
do exactly the opposite. Thus, under this policy, the physician would 
have absolutely no power to prevent harm to a third party at risk 
because the nature of the policy would drastically reduce the rate 
of patient disclosure of intention. And since the policy would fail 
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to accomplish the results it was created to achieve, the policy would 
be unnecessary and might even cause more harm than good. 
XI. Candidates for Professional Rule of Confidentiality 
In order to discover which rule would promote the best overall 
consequences, it might be helpful to formulate several experimental 
rules and then test them for efficacy. Although we will not be able 
to contemplate an exhaustive list, by covering rules from each of 
several categories we might be able to arrive at the best possible 
rule for confidentiality in light of the inadequacies of the other 
candidates. 
Our first test case might be the rule formulation already 
considered above: a professional should always maintain her client's 
confidentiality, except in cases where the client poses a significant 
threat of harm to an identifiable third party. I have included the 
qualifying term "significant" to eliminate cases in which the harm 
is so minimal that warning would just upset a lot of people 
unnecessarily. The term "identifiable" is used in recognition of the 
fact that the professional has no recourse for preventing harm when 
she does not even know toward whom the harm is aimed. 
Of course, I've already demonstrated how ineffective, and 
perhaps harmful, this policy might be. A rule that requires 
professionals to warn third parties at risk of harm at the hands of 
their clients would have to be made known to all clients under the 
professional's care or advisement due to considerations of informed 
consent. However, if this were the case, then clients whose 
intentions were to inflict harm on third parties simply would not 
disclose this incriminating information to their psychiatrists, 
doctors, and so on. Therefore, the point of instating the rule to 
begin with would be sorely missed in practice. Without the relevant 
information, professionals would not be in a position to help anyone 
at risk of harm. 
Another option might be to have one rule for professionals 
and another for patients. That is, a professional association might 
advertise an absolute rule of confidentiality as the overall 
professional policy, but violate confidentiality when they deemed 
it appropriate. Under this approach, the public would believe that 
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the professional policy of a certain organization was to ensure 
absolute client confidentiality, and therefore, the problem of 
inadequate disclosure would potentially be solved. Clients would 
be more likely to disclose the information necessary for the 
professional to treat their illnesses or mental disorders, or build a 
proper legal defense, but professionals would reserve the right to 
break confidence whenever they felt that doing so would promote 
the greatest good for the greatest number of people. 
However, this approach seems obviously unethical. Failing to 
inform a client of a "secret" confidentiality policy that directly 
affects him violates the client's right of informed consent, and 
thereby fails to respect the client as an autonomous agent who has 
the capacity to judge for himself the pros and cons of various courses 
of action. A client who is unaware that the psychotherapist she is 
seeing operates under a secret professional code that allows her to 
disclose information of such and such a type might assume that all 
information shared within the confines of the professional setting 
will be held in the strictest confidence. Indeed, such an assumption 
is often considered to be an implicit feature of the professional-
client relationship. Breaking this implicit relationship constitutes a 
deliberate deception on the part of the professional to all clients, 
and deception has no place in the professional setting. Without a 
relationship of trust between professionals and their clients, 
professions fail to do the work they were created to do. Thus, the 
double rule model is inadequate. 
Another alternative might be for a professional association to 
adopt a strong presumption in favor of confidentiality, but have no 
rule that addresses confidentiality directly. The public would be 
aware that this was the policy, and thus, there would be no 
difficulties with informed consent. However, it seems to me that 
the abandonment approach gets us no further than the act utilitarian 
approach. Without guidelines for making decisions, there would 
likely be inconsistency among professionals in the same field. The 
chances of a client's confidence being breached by a professional 
the client trusts might depend more on which professional the client 
chooses to go to rather than what type of information the client 
discloses. By having what one might call a 'non'-policy regarding 
confidentiality in the professions, we lose an important element of 
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objectivity that seems necessary to ensure consistency and fairness 
when making decisions about breaching client confidentiality. 
Furthermore, a rule that lacks specificity might impede 
disclosure even moreso than a rule that has only a few specific 
excep t ions . That is, a client likely would refrain from 
communicating information if he knew the professional would 
divulge information that fell under the specific exceptions to a rule 
of confidentiality. Certainly, this client would refrain from 
communicating if he thought the professional might divulge. In 
fact, it is likely that there would be even more instances of restrained 
communication in the latter, non-specific case. 
As I have argued before, though, specifying the exceptions to 
a rule of confidentiality does not solve the problem of inadequate 
disclosure. If the client does not want anyone to know, he simply 
will not disclose information that falls under the exception clause. 
This can be extremely harmful, especially in cases where the 
exception deals with information about intent to harm third parties. 
Exceptions to professional rules of confidentiality can result 
in negative events, not only for third parties affected by a dangerous 
client, but also for the client himself. Often the client is swayed 
from communicating to a professional the very thing with which 
the client needs the most help. In the case of a client who intends to 
commit future crimes, this intention needs to be addressed in order 
to help the client or a third party. For example, a client who, on a 
routine visit to his psychotherapist, confesses an urge to kill his ex-
wife, needs to be treated. It is highly possible that after discussing 
his frustrations with his therapist and obtaining advice on how to 
deal with his stress, the man's urge will subside. Then, the 
psychiatrist will have done his job by successfully treating his client 
and simultaneously preventing a potential harm to a third party at 
risk. Yet, the therapist would not be able to accomplish this without 
full disclosure from his client. And since exceptions to rules of 
confidentiality impede full disclosure, they undermine the goals of 
a profession, which itself promotes social utility. 
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XII. An Absolute Rule of Confidentiality 
I would argue, then, that any rule of confidentiality with 
exceptions built into it is self-defeating. That is, whatever end is 
intended to be achieved by including a given exception is always 
defeated because public knowledge of the exception eliminates 
client disclosure. In contrast, though, rules that fail to spell out 
specific circumstances under which it is permissible to break client 
confidentiality leave too much room for inconsistency and 
unfairness. In light of my negative analysis of both rules with 
exceptions and non-rules, I must conclude that the best candidate 
for a rule of confidentiality is one that includes no exceptions, but 
is, instead, an absolute rule. The only way for professions to function 
at the level at which they are designed to function is for all 
professions to adopt absolute rules of confidentiality. My argument, 
rule utilitarian in nature, looks like this: 
1) Professions serve a desirable social function. 
2) If professions are to fulfill this function, then 
clients must feel comfortable disclosing 
personal information. 
3) In order for clients to feel comfortable 
disclosing personal information, absolute 
confidentiality must be ensured. 
4) Therefore, absolute confidentiality must be 
ensured. 
5) Therefore, breaches of confidence are never 
morally permissible. 
This is a valid argument: if all the premises are true, then the 
conclusion must also be true. I have argued for all of these premises 
at other points in this paper, and therefore, I will not defend them 
here. 
I will, however, address David Lyons' objection to rule 
utilitarianism mentioned earlier. Lyons contends that "a mere appeal 
to rules does not necessarily yield non-equivalence with simple 
[act] utilitarianism." 5 0 In effect, what Lyons argues is that rule 
utilitarianism cannot be distinct from act utilitarianism because he 
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takes it that the only truly utilitarian rule is just the principle of 
utility: "act so as to promote the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people." If we choose any other rule, then there would 
almost assuredly be cases in which abiding by the rule would not 
produce optimific results, and allowing for cases that fail to produce 
optimific results is anti-utilitarian. But the rule stated above is just 
the equivalent of act utilitarianism. Thus, rule utilitarianism always 
collapses into act utilitarianism. 
My intention is not to argue that Lyons' objection holds no 
water against other rule utilitarian arguments. However, I do want 
to contend that my argument regarding confidentiality is not 
susceptible to his cr i t icism. Maintaining absolute client 
confidentiality in the professional setting always produces optimific 
consequences for society as a whole because without the assurance 
of confidence, clients would not willingly disclose information 
concerning maleficent intentions. But this is exactly the information 
that the professional needs to know in order to treat the client, and 
thereby prevent harmful consequences to third parties at risk. The 
assertion that there would be some instances in the professional 
setting in which having a rule that allowed breaking confidentiality 
would produce more good than abiding by an absolute rule is simply 
false. Therefore, my rule utilitarian argument for an absolute rule 
of confidentiality is not subject to Lyons' objection that rule 
utilitarianism always reduces to act utilitarianism. 
XIII. Conclusion 
Human beings live together in societies and should, therefore, 
consider the well-being of those who share their society. This cannot 
exclude considerations of how actions will affect other people. 
Because professions such as psychiatry, medicine and law tend to 
benefit society as a whole, we should make sure professionals are 
able to fulfill their utilitarian roles to the fullest. This involves having 
professional policies that enable professionals to provide the best 
aid possible to their clients. An absolute rule of confidentiality is 
one way to ensure that clients, and in turn society, reap the maximum 
benefit from these institutions. 
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Some might want to say that my conclusion is implausible 
because of the case law established in the Tarasoff case, which 
prescribes not only a duty to warn, but an even broader duty for 
professionals to take whatever measures necessary to protect third 
parties at risk of harm from their clients. An absolute rule of 
confidentiality will often conflict with the law, and if it is always 
immoral to break the law, then the absolute rule must be immoral. 
My response to this objection, however, is that the Tarasoff 
case was wrongly decided. Had the judges in this case made the 
correct considerations instead of appealing to their humanitarian 
intuitions, they would have concluded that absolute confidentiality 
is the only way to ensure the proper functioning of professions that 
promote well-being within society. Our laws do not entail morality. 
This fact becomes evident when one considers slavery in antebellum 
America. Although it was perfectly legal to own slaves before 1863, 
most contemporary Americans believe that slavery was as immoral 
then as it is now. I would argue, then, that the Tarasoff precedent 
established a bad law because imposing an obligation on a 
professional to break her client's confidence fails to promote overall 
social utility. 
This paper began by introducing the dilemma of confidentiality 
faced by professionals, which forces them to choose between the 
privacy and well-being of the clients they are trying to help and the 
public, whose well-being they must also consider. In particular, I 
have been interested in this dilemma as it pertains to the case of the 
uncooperative HIV-infected client. Although the threat of HIV-
transmission from infected to uninfected parties is harrowing, the 
evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of supporting an absolute rule 
of confidentiality between the health care professional and his 
infected patient. The best course of action the professional can take 
is to advise his patient to either warn his wife or to alter his own 
behavior significantly. Reminding him of the terrible complications 
that often accompany HIV/ AIDS, as well as the effect that his 
failure to warn may have on his children, might convince him to 
notify his wife. But first and foremost, the professional's duty is to 
the client who is seeking assistance from him. Society is better off 
when we allow professionals to do their jobs correctly, and having 
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an absolute rule of confidentiality in the professional setting is the 
best way to ensure that this occurs. 
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